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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

DEPENDENT PATENT CLAIMS AND PROSECUTION HISTORY
ESTOPPEL: WEAKENING THE DOCTRINE OF EQUIVALENTS

I. INTRODUCTION
The United States Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit continue to
debate the extent to which the doctrine of equivalents should be utilized in
patent litigation, especially with regard to the ongoing Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu
Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co. case.1 The doctrine of equivalents protects
patent claims that are not literally infringed, but infringed by another’s
invention whose differences with the claim in question are trivial.2 In light of
the decisions in the Festo case, the Federal Circuit continues to extend the
reach of prosecution history estoppel, which bars a determination of
equivalence and prohibits a patent owner from claiming that subject matter
relinquished during prosecution of the patent is entitled to coverage.3 The
Federal Circuit’s recent rulings in Honeywell International Inc. v. Hamilton
Sundstrand Corp.4 and Deering Precision Instruments, L.L.C. v. Vector
Distribution Systems, Inc.5 expanded the bounds of prosecution history
estoppel to include the situation in which the patent applicant amends a
previously dependent claim into an independent claim.6 Although there are
positive ramifications associated with these cases, the Federal Circuit has
succeeded in further withering the doctrine of equivalents and the protections
that it provides patentees.
This Comment begins with a background on patents and the various
doctrines involved, discusses the leading cases and the Federal Circuit’s
decisions, and concludes with an analysis of the rationales and ramifications of
the court’s decisions—both positive and negative.

1. 344 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 988 (2004); 535 U.S. 722 (2002);
172 F.3d 1361 (Fed. Cir. 1999); 72 F.3d 857 (Fed. Cir. 1995); No. CIV.A.88-1814-MA, 1993
WL 1510657 (D. Mass. 1993).
2. Matthew J. Conigliaro et al., Foreseeability in Patent Law, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
1045, 1047 (2001).
3. Pharmacia & Upjohn Co. v. Mylan Pharm., Inc., 170 F.3d 1373, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
4. 370 F.3d 1131 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
5. 347 F.3d 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1184 (2004).
6. Honeywell, 370 F.3d at 1141; Deering, 347 F.3d at 1326.
257
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II. BACKGROUND
A.

The Patenting Process

The United States government has the authority to grant patents pursuant
to Article I of the Constitution because patent laws “promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts” by rewarding innovation.7 The government grants to
a patentee the exclusive rights to an invention for a set period of time, after
which the invention is free to be used by the public.8 In essence, a patent
confers upon the patentee a limited monopoly in exchange for publicly
disclosing the invention.9
The federal government’s authority to grant patents rests with the United
States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO).10 Within the USPTO, patent
examiners review each application to determine whether various substantive
and procedural requirements for patentability are met.11 The examiners
conduct a prior art search to determine if the pending claims are within the
patentable subject matter,12 novel,13 useful,14 and nonobvious with regard to
what is known in the art.15 The examiner determines the scope of the patent by
literally interpreting the claims in light of the prior art, and also by considering

7. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
8. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1)–(2) (2000).
Every patent shall contain a short title of the invention and a grant to the patentee, his
heirs or assigns, of the right to exclude others from making, using, offering for sale, or
selling the invention throughout the United States or importing the invention into the
United States, and, if the invention is a process, of the right to exclude others from using,
offering for sale or selling throughout the United States, or importing into the United
States, products made by that process, referring to the specification for the particulars
thereof.
Id. § 154(a)(1).
9. See id. § 154(a)–(b).
10. See id. § 1(a).
11. See id. §§ 111, 112 (describing the requirements for the patent application and
specifications, respectively, regarding the form of the applications).
12. See id. § 101.
13. See 35 U.S.C. § 102. A rejection for anticipation requires that each limitation of the
claimed invention be disclosed in a single prior art reference; in addition, the reference must be
enabling and sufficiently describe the claimed invention such that the inventor has placed the
invention in possession of a person of ordinary skill in the art. In re Paulsen, 30 F.3d 1475,
1478–79 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
14. See 35 U.S.C. § 101.
15. See id. § 103. Inventors, patent agents, patent attorneys, and others involved in the
preparation or prosecution of applications also have a duty of candor and good faith in dealing
with the USPTO, requiring the patentee to disclose all relevant prior art to the USPTO. 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.56 (2005). Although the patentee has a duty to disclose all known relevant prior art, this duty
does not require (but only encourages) the patentee to actually conduct a prior art search before
filing the application. Id.
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the specification, expert testimony, and any statements made by the applicant
during the patenting process.16
Once the patent examiner is satisfied with the sufficiency of the application
in light of the prior art and the claims, the USPTO decides whether to issue the
patent based on the application.17 However, if the examiner is not convinced
of the novelty or nonobviousness of the application, the USPTO may reject the
patent application and send an “office action” to the prospective patentee
describing the reasons for the rejection.18 Upon rejection, the patentee is given
the choice of amending the application to narrow the scope of the patent to fit
within the prior art and gain patentability, or to appeal the rejection and argue
with the patent examiner regarding the prior art and the reasons for rejection.19
B.

How Patents Are Drafted

A patent application contains a written description of the invention along
with a number of “claims” defining the scope of the invention.20 Patents are
interpreted pursuant to the invention described within the claims, and these
claims may be either independent or dependent. When an applicant states a
claim in “dependent form,” the claim incorporates by reference a previous
independent or dependent claim and adds some additional limitation.21 A
dependent claim “is narrower in scope than the claim upon which it is
dependent”22 and can also be used to remedy indefinite claim language.23

16. See 5A DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 18.01 (2005). These statements
between the prospective patentee and the USPTO become part of the “prosecution history.” See
id.
17. 35 U.S.C. § 131; 37 C.F.R. § 1.104.
18. DONALD S. CHISUM & MICHAEL A. JACOBS, WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
GUIDEBOOK: UNITED STATES 2-106 (1992).
19. 37 C.F.R. § 1.111. A rejection in a second office action is a “final rejection.” CHISUM
& JACOBS, supra note 18, at 2-107 n.21. After a “final rejection,” the patent applicant may also
appeal the rejection to the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences, and then to the U.S. District
Court or to the Federal Circuit if the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences upholds the
rejection. See 35 U.S.C. § 134 (detailing appeals to the Board of Patent Appeals and
Interferences); id. § 145 (appeals to the U.S. District Court); id. § 141 (appeals to the Federal
Circuit).
20. 35 U.S.C. § 112. The purpose of the written description requirement is to show that the
inventor was actually in possession of the claimed invention at the time the application was filed.
Vas-Cath Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1563–64 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
21. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (“[A] claim in dependent form shall contain a reference to a claim
previously set forth and then specify a further limitation of the subject matter claimed.”).
22. ROBERT C. FABER, LANDIS ON MECHANICS OF PATENT CLAIM DRAFTING § 2:9, at 223–24 (5th ed., release no. 2, 2005).
23. See JEFFREY G. SHELDON, HOW TO WRITE A PATENT APPLICATION § 6.5.7.1, at 6-70
(release no. 4, 1996) (“For example, if a claim recites an element that is ‘sufficiently long,’ a
dependent claim can specify that the element is ‘at least five inches long.’”).
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Patent applications typically involve multiple claims, beginning with broad
independent claims followed by narrower dependent claims.24 One benefit of
incorporating dependent claims into the application is that, in general, “[o]ne
who does not infringe an independent claim cannot infringe a claim dependent
on . . . that claim.”25 As such, practitioners employ dependent claims as a
means of stretching the protection of the claimed invention by drafting an
independent claim that is broad—but not broad enough that it is anticipated or
obvious in view of prior art—and then adding dependent claims so that the
invention will be interpreted to provide wide protection for infringement
purposes.
The claims drafted by the applicant relay to the patent examiner, as well as
the public, what the inventor regards as his invention, as well as what is
intended to be protected and left unprotected by the patent.26 As a result, the
claims, as well as the application as a whole, serve a notice function as to what
the inventor believes the invention entails.27
One of the advantages associated with a patent is the deference given by
the courts to the judgment of the examiner: “A patent shall be presumed
valid.”28 The Patent Act provides that “[e]ach claim of a patent (whether in
independent, dependent, or multiple dependent form) shall be presumed valid
independently of the validity of other claims; dependent or multiple dependent
claims shall be presumed valid even though dependent upon an invalid
claim.”29 Dependent claims can survive in spite of the invalid parent claim
because dependent claims do not depend on the parent claim for their validity,
but merely for some of their language.30 Thus, the use of narrower dependent
claims protects the patent against the possibility that the independent claims
will be determined to be invalid.31

24. See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (allowing multiple dependent claims).
25. Wahpeton Canvas Co. v. Frontier, Inc., 870 F.2d 1546, 1552 n.9 (Fed. Cir. 1989); see Ex
parte Ligh, 159 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 61 (Patent Office Bd. of App. 1967) (holding it erroneous to
reject a dependent claim yet allow the parent claim).
26. See FABER, supra note 22, § 1:1, at 1-2.
27. “[P]ublic notice is an important objective of patent prosecution . . . .” In re Morris, 127
F.3d 1048, 1054 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (citing Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520
U.S. 17, 24 (1997)); see FABER, supra note 22, § 1:2, at 1-3 (comparing claim drafting and the
bounds of the invention to the bounds of real estate).
28. 35 U.S.C. § 282.
29. Id. “If the independent claim reads on prior art, but the dependent claim doesn’t, then
the dependent claim survives and is treated as if it were written in full independent form.” LEE A.
HOLLAAR, LEGAL PROTECTION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, ch. 4 § IV.B.4 (2002), available at
http://digital-law-online.info/lpdi1.0/treatise58.html. An invention “reads” on a claim when “all
limitations of the claim are found in the reference, or ‘fully met’ by it.” Kalman v. KimberlyClark Corp., 713 F.2d 760, 772 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
30. HOLLAAR, supra note 29, ch. 4 § VII.B.
31. 35 U.S.C. § 282.
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A claim is properly dependent if it includes every limitation of the claim to
which it refers,32 and as such, a dependent claim shall not conceivably be
infringed by anything which would not also infringe the basic claim.33
Accordingly, when any claim is allowed as valid by the examiner, all
dependent claims will then be allowed without further examination for novelty
or obviousness; the examiner only needs to ensure that the dependent claims
are in proper form.34
Recently, the Federal Circuit has attacked the vitality and usefulness of
dependent claims. The Federal Circuit originally stated: “It is axiomatic that
dependent claims cannot be found infringed unless the claims from which they
depend have been found to have been infringed.”35 However, in Wilson
Sporting Goods Co. v. David Geoffrey & Associates,36 the Federal Circuit
backtracked from its previous statement, declaring that “[w]hile this
proposition is no doubt generally correct, it does not apply in the circumstances
of this case.”37 The Wilson court stated that non-infringement of an
independent claim does not mean that all reliant dependent claims will not be
infringed.38 In light of the Wilson case and other cases limiting the use of
32. Id. § 112 (“A claim in dependent form shall be construed to incorporate by reference all
the limitations of the claim to which it refers.”).
33. See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING
PROCEDURE § 608.01(n) (8th ed., rev. 2004) [hereinafter MPEP].
34. HOLLAAR, supra note 29, ch. 4 § IV.B.4.
35. Wahpeton Canvas Co. v. Frontier, Inc., 870 F.2d 1546, 1553 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
36. 904 F.2d 677 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
37. Id. at 685.
38. Id. at 685–86. In Wilson, the examiner issued Wilson’s patent without comment for one
independent claim and twenty-six dependent claims. Id. at 680. Wilson’s patent dealt with the
configuration of dimples on a golf ball cover. Id. at 679. Following a finding of willful
infringement, Dunlop appealed, arguing that if its product was an equivalent of the Wilson claim,
then the prior art would also be deemed an equivalent. Id. at 678, 683. The Federal Circuit
reversed the trial court’s judgment of infringement of the independent claim because the asserted
range of the equivalents of the claim limitations would encompass the prior art golf ball. Id. at
686. Accordingly, because the dependent claims were by definition narrower in scope than
independent claims, “it does not automatically follow that the ranges of equivalents of these
narrower claims would encompass the prior art, because of their added limitations.” Id. When
the reason for non-infringement of the independent claim is that the accused product did not
contain the claim limitation or its equivalent, the dependent claim will not be infringed; however,
the court held that this was not the situation in Wilson. Id. The burden was placed on Wilson to
prove that the range of equivalents sought for infringement purposes would not also cover the
prior art claims. Id. at 685. To answer this question, the court used a hypothetical patent claim
that literally covered the accused product, and asked whether the hypothetical claim would have
been allowed by the patent office in view of the prior art. Id. at 684. The court concluded that
none of the dependent claims could be given a range of equivalents that would lead Dunlop’s
balls to be infringing because “that would extend Wilson’s patent protection beyond hypothetical
claims it could lawfully have obtained from the [Patent and Trademark Office].” Id. at 686.
Wilson failed to convince the court that the range of equivalents sought was broad enough to
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dependent patent claims, the Federal Circuit in Honeywell and Deering was set
to cripple patent prosecution tradition.
C. Literal Infringement of Patent Claims
“An infringement analysis entails two steps. The first step is determining
the meaning and scope of the patent claims asserted to be infringed. . . . The
second step is comparing the properly construed claims to the device accused
of infringing.”39 A patent claim is infringed when it “reads” on the allegedly
infringing article or process, meaning that “all limitations of the claim are
found in the reference, or ‘fully met’ by it.”40 Each element of the claim must
be present within the alleged infringing invention.41 However, it is not
necessary to infringe all claims of a patent; it is only necessary to infringe upon
one claim for the patent to be infringed. As a result, the more elements that are
present within a claim, the less subject matter is protected by the claim, as it
will be more difficult for a potentially infringing device to contain all of the
listed elements.42
Infringement occurs when one of the rights to exclude is violated,
including the sale or offer for sale of a patented invention.43 Liability for
infringement has also been extended beyond direct infringement to include
those who actively induce infringement of a patent,44 or those who contribute
to the infringement of the patent.45 Ultimately, however, if there is any

encompass Dunlop’s balls without also encompassing the balls cited in the prior art. Id. For an
examination of the Wilson case and its effect on the doctrine of equivalents, see Jean M. Barkley,
The Doctrine of Equivalents Analysis After Wilson Sporting Goods, 35 ARIZ. L. REV. 765 (1993).
39. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 976 (Fed. Cir. 1995), aff’d, 517
U.S. 370 (1996) (citation omitted). Literal infringement will be found when the defendant’s
device is covered within the literal meaning of the claims as interpreted by the court after “claim
construction.” See id. at 970–71.
40. Kalman v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 713 F.2d 760, 772 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
41. See Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 607 (1950).
42. See Jamesbury Corp. v. Litton Indus. Prods., Inc., 586 F.2d 917, 924 (2d Cir. 1978).
43. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2000) (“Except as otherwise provided in this title, whoever without
authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented invention, within the United States or
imports into the United States any patented invention during the term of the patent therefor,
infringes the patent.”).
44. Id. § 271(b).
45. Id. § 271(c).
Whoever offers to sell or sells within the United States or imports into the United States a
component of a patented machine, manufacture, combination or composition, or a
material or apparatus for use in practicing a patented process, constituting a material part
of the invention, knowing the same to be especially made or especially adapted for use in
an infringement of such patent, and not a staple article or commodity of commerce
suitable for substantial noninfringing use, shall be liable as a contributory infringer.
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element that does not have a corresponding aspect in the alleged-infringing
device or method, then the claim with that element is not literally infringed.
As an example, consider a hypothetical patent claim for a chair, which, as
one element, requires “legs of between 20 and 25 inches in length.” Under
normal circumstances, a chair with legs between 20 and 25 inches in length
will literally infringe upon the claim (assuming the other elements are also
present in the potentially infringing invention), while a chair with legs less than
20 inches or greater than 25 inches in length will not literally infringe.
D. Doctrine of Equivalents—Non-literal Infringement
Even if a claim is not literally infringed, a patent owner can still be
protected by asserting the doctrine of equivalents, which “allows the patentee
to claim those insubstantial alterations that were not captured in drafting the
original patent claim but which could be created through trivial changes.”46
This doctrine was utilized “[t]o temper unsparing logic and prevent an
infringer from stealing the benefit of the invention.”47 It attempts to strike a
balance between ensuring that the patentee enjoys the full benefit of his patent
and ensuring that the claims give “fair notice” of the patent’s scope.48
The Supreme Court has both bolstered and hindered the use of the doctrine
of equivalents. Winans v. Denmead49 was the first decision to use the doctrine
to do serious damage to the literal meaning of a claim’s language.50 The
Supreme Court in Burns v. Meyer,51 however, warned about the use of the
doctrine of equivalents, stating that “[t]he courts . . . should be careful not to
enlarge, by construction, the claim which the Patent Office has admitted, and
which the patentee has acquiesced in, beyond the fair interpretation of its
terms.”52 Despite this warning, the Supreme Court affirmed the role of the
doctrine of equivalents in Graver Tank & Manufacturing Co. v. Linde Air
Products Co.53 In Graver Tank, the Supreme Court supported the rationale

Id. As one court has explained, “[W]ithout direct infringement there can not be contributory
infringement or inducement of infringement.” BP Chems. Ltd. v. Union Carbide Corp., 4 F.3d
975, 981 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
46. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki, Co., 535 U.S. 722, 733 (2002).
47. Royal Typewriter Co. v. Remington Rand, Inc., 168 F.2d 691, 692 (2d Cir. 1948).
48. London v. Carson Pirie Scott & Co., 946 F.2d 1534, 1538 (Fed. Cir. 1991); see also
Litton Sys., Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc., 145 F.3d 1472, 1474 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (stating the importance
of public notice); Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 368, 390 (1996) (discussing
the need for balance between the rights of protection and notice).
49. 56 U.S. (15 How.) 330 (1853).
50. Id. at 340–41.
51. 100 U.S. 671 (1879).
52. Id. at 672.
53. 339 U.S. 605 (1950). Justice Jackson, writing for the majority, noted that without the
doctrine of equivalents, an “unscrupulous copyist” would be encouraged to make insignificant
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behind the doctrine of equivalents, stating that “to permit imitation of a
patented invention which does not copy every literal detail would be to convert
the protection of the patent grant into a hollow and useless thing.”54 Limiting
infringement protection to literal infringement “would deprive [the patentee] of
the benefit of his invention and would foster concealment rather than
disclosure of inventions, which is one of the primary purposes of the patent
system.”55 In 1997, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the vitality of the doctrine
of equivalents in Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chemical Co.56
An accused product may infringe under the doctrine of equivalents “if it
performs substantially the same function in substantially the same way to
obtain the same result.”57 The “essential inquiry” for the use of the doctrine is:
“Does the accused product or process contain elements identical or equivalent
to each claimed element of the patented invention?”58 This inquiry is not
limited to equivalents known at the time the patent issues, nor is it limited to
the time of disclosure; equivalency is measured “at the time of infringement.”59
However, it is essential that the doctrine of equivalents be applied to the
individual elements within the claim, and not to the invention as a whole,
because each element is “material to defining the scope of the patented
invention.”60
Using the previous chair claim example, which recites as one element
“legs of between 20 and 25 inches in length,” consider a chair that meets the
other elements of the claim but has legs of 25.1 inches in length. The claim
could still be found to infringe under the doctrine of equivalents if a jury were
to determine that legs of 25.1 inches were equivalent to legs of 25 inches in
length.61 The doctrine of equivalents prevents an accused infringer from

changes to an invention in order to take the copied invention outside of the scope of the claims,
leaving the patentee with no legal recourse against the infringer. Id. at 607.
54. Id.
55. Id. Justice Jackson also noted that the doctrine of equivalents is needed because
“[o]utright and forthright duplication is a dull and very rare type of infringement.” Id.
56. 520 U.S. 17, 17 (1997).
57. Graver, 339 U.S. at 608 (quoting Sanitary Refrigerator Co. v. Winters, 280 U.S. 30, 42
(1929)). There is also a reverse doctrine of equivalents, which provides that
where a device is so far changed in principle from a patented article that it performs the
same or a similar function in a substantially different way, but nevertheless falls within
the literal words of the claim, the doctrine of equivalents may be used to restrict the claim
and defeat the patentee’s action for infringement.
Id. at 608–09.
58. Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 40.
59. Id. at 37.
60. Id. at 29.
61. As stated in Warner-Jenkinson, a finding of infringement under the doctrine of
equivalents can be made by finding equivalents of each element of the claim, not just one element
as seen in this illustration. Id. at 29.
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avoiding liability if the only differences between the two are insubstantial,
while retaining the invention’s essential identity.62 In deciding whether a chair
with legs of 25.1 inches in length is equivalent to the claimed chair with legs of
25 inches, a jury would ask whether the chair with 25.1-inch legs performed
“substantially the same function in substantially the same way” to achieve
substantially the same result as the chair with 25-inch legs.63
E.

Prosecution History Estoppel

Although the doctrine of equivalents works in favor of patentees,
protecting against potentially infringing inventions that do not fall within the
literal language of the claim, there are limitations on the doctrine of
equivalents. These limitations include: (1) a “focus on individual elements,”
(2) a “special vigilance against allowing the concept of equivalence to
eliminate completely any such elements,” and (3) prosecution history estoppel,
sometimes called “file wrapper estoppel.”64 The “file wrapper” is the complete
record of the prosecution proceedings, from the filing of the patent to its
issuance,65 and is especially important because the applicant’s statements to
the USPTO during prosecution place additional limitations on the protections
available for the patent claim.66
Prosecution history estoppel may bar the patentee from asserting the
doctrine of equivalents if the scope of the claims has been narrowed by
amendment during prosecution.67 When the patent examiner rejects a claim,
the applicant is given the right to appeal the rejection.68 However, if the
applicant chooses not to appeal, “a narrowing amendment made to satisfy any
requirement of the Patent Act may give rise to an estoppel.”69 Prosecution

62. See Graver Tank, 339 U.S. at 607–08; Eagle Comtronics, Inc. v. Arrow Commc’n Labs.,
Inc., 305 F.3d 1303, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
63. Graver Tank, 339 U.S. at 608; see also Perkin-Elmer Corp. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp.,
822 F.2d 1528, 1532–33 (Fed. Cir. 1987). This test, the “function-way-result” test, is one of
several used to determine equivalence. See Interactive Pictures Corp. v. Infinite Pictures, Inc.,
274 F.3d 1371, 1382–83 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
64. Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 40–41.
65. 5A CHISUM, supra note 16, § 18.05.
66. See id. § 18.01.
67. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki, Co., 535 U.S. 722, 733–34 (2002).
68. See supra notes 18–19 and accompanying text.
69. Festo, 535 U.S. at 736 (“Estoppel arises when [the] amendment is made . . . and the
amendment narrows the patent’s scope.”). Recently, the Federal Circuit has applied prosecution
estoppel in a number of situations in which the Court determined that the patentee narrowed a
claim for the sake of patentability. See Mycogen Plant Sci., Inc. v. Monsanto Co., 252 F.3d 1306,
1319–20 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (canceling a claim); Am. Permahedge, Inc. v. Barcana, Inc., 105 F.3d
1441, 1446 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (using a narrowing amendment in a different claim); Southwall
Techs. Inc. v. Cardinal IG Co., 54 F.3d 1570, 1583–84 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (narrowing remarks). A
thorough list and summary of cases in which the Federal Circuit has found a narrowing
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history estoppel “limits the range of equivalents available to a patentee by
preventing recapture of subject matter surrendered during prosecution of the
patent.”70
The rationale for this rule is that the amendment is a “concession that the
invention as patented does not reach as far as the original claim”71 and is a
“general disclaimer of the territory between the original claim and the amended
claim.”72 This rationale fits with the basic theory behind prosecution history
estoppel: “When . . . the patentee originally claimed the subject matter alleged
to infringe but then narrowed the claim in response to a rejection, he may not
argue that the surrendered territory comprised unforeseen subject matter that
should be deemed equivalent to the literal claims of the issued patent.”73 If it
were otherwise, “the inventor might avoid the [USPTO’s] gatekeeping role and
seek to recapture in an infringement action the very subject matter surrendered
as a condition of receiving the patent.”74
There is a presumption of estoppel when an amendment is determined to
be for a reason related to patentability.75 This presumption may be rebutted,
however, if a patentee shows “an appropriate reason for a required
amendment.”76 The patentee may demonstrate that: (1) “the alleged equivalent
would have been unforeseeable at the time of the narrowing amendment,” (2)
“the rationale underlying the narrowing amendment bore no more than a
tangential relation to the equivalent” in question,” or (3) “there was ‘some

amendment and subsequently applied prosecution history estoppel is provided in Michael N.
Haynes, Clearing the Patent Minefield—A Guide to Avoiding Infringement, 86 J. PAT. &
TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 511, 514–15 (2004).
70. Southwall, 54 F.3d at 1579. The recapture rule and the applicability of prosecution
history estoppel both depend upon whether an applicant surrendered subject matter during
prosecution. See, e.g., Hester Indus., Inc. v. Stein, Inc., 142 F.3d 1472, 1480–84 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
71. Festo, 535 U.S. at 734.
72. Id. at 740.
73. Id. at 733–34.
74. Id. at 734; see Corbin Cabinet Lock Co. v. Eagle Lock Co., 150 U.S. 38, 40 (1893)
(“Having originally sought broader claims, which were rejected, and having acquiesced in such
rejection,” the patentee may not be allowed “to insist upon such construction of the allowed claim
as would cover what had been previously rejected.”).
75. When the patentee originally claims the subject matter but, in response to a rejection by
the examiner, narrows the scope of the claim, “courts may presume the amended text was
composed with awareness of this rule and that the territory surrendered is not an equivalent of the
territory claimed.” Festo, 535 U.S. at 741.
76. Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 15, 33 (1996). “The
patentee must show that at the time of the amendment one skilled in the art could not reasonably
be expected to have drafted a claim that would have literally encompassed the alleged
equivalent.” Festo, 535 U.S. at 741.
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other reason’ suggesting that the patentee could not reasonably have been
expected to have described the alleged equivalent.”77
The pressures placed upon the patentee due to prosecution history estoppel
eased with the Supreme Court’s decision in Festo.78 In an opinion by Justice
Kennedy, the Court rejected the Federal Circuit’s “complete bar” rule, which
dictated that a patentee’s act of amending claim limitations during prosecution
created an estoppel that barred every equivalent to the amended claim
limitation.79 The Court held that if the patentee narrows an amendment, the
patentee should be presumed to have surrendered all equivalents to the
amended claim limitation.80 However, a truly “cosmetic” amendment would
not narrow a claim’s scope or create an estoppel.81 The Court also held that
these criteria apply irrespective of whether the amendment was made by
restricting a particular claim during prosecution or by replacing a broad claim
with a narrower one in order to satisfy the Patent Act’s requirements.82 The
patentee, however, bears “the burden of showing that the amendment does not
surrender the particular equivalent in question.”83
Using the previous chair claim example, which recites as one element
“legs of between 20 and 25 inches in length,” suppose the USPTO rejected this
claim due to prior art and the claimant amended the claim to overcome the
rejection, stating as one element “legs of between 20 and 23 inches in length.”
Assuming this amended claim was patentable, the patentee would be barred
under prosecution history estoppel from asserting an infringement claim
regarding a chair with legs of 24 inches in length, regardless of whether 24
inches is equivalent to “between 20 and 23 inches.”
III. FEDERAL CIRCUIT’S APPLICATION OF THE DOCTRINE OF
EQUIVALENTS AND PROSECUTION HISTORY ESTOPPEL TO PREVIOUSLY
DEPENDENT PATENT CLAIMS
A.

Honeywell International Inc. v. Hamilton Sundstrand Corp.

In Honeywell International, Inc. v. Hamilton Sundstrand Corp.,84 all of the
Honeywell patents at issue, United States Patent No. 4,380,893 (the “’893
patent”) and Patent No. 4,428,194 (the “’194 patent”), were directed to an
aircraft auxiliary power unit (APU), a small turbine engine normally placed in
77. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 344 F.3d 1359, 1368 (Fed. Cir.
2003) (citing Festo, 535 U.S. at 740–41).
78. 535 U.S. 722.
79. Id. at 727, 737.
80. Id. at 740.
81. Id. at 736–37.
82. Id. at 736.
83. Festo, 535 U.S. at 740.
84. 370 F.3d 1131 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
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the tail section of an aircraft.85 The Honeywell APU was designed to be more
efficient by avoiding excess air bleeding in its control of “surge,” a flow
instability due to a buildup of pressure in the main air duct.86 In the claimed
invention, “[a]mbient air is drawn through a set of adjustable inlet guide
vanes” in order to more effectively and efficiently control surge by avoiding
excess air bleeding.87 In order to be more efficient, the Honeywell invention
established a “set point,” the minimum flow at which surge could be avoided.88
The value of the set point was a function of the position of the inlet guide
vanes.89
Sundstrand also manufactures an APU that adjusts a surge bleed valve by
comparing a flow-related parameter to a set point.90 However, the Sundstrand
APU establishes a set point that is dependent upon ambient air temperature, as
opposed to a measurement of the inlet guide vane position like in the
Honeywell invention.91 After Honeywell filed suit against Sundstrand for
infringement of the ’893 and ’194 patents, Sundstrand “pointed out that all of
the asserted claims were originally dependent on other claims in Honeywell’s
patent applications” and that these other claims “did not contain the inlet guide
vane limitation.”92 The patent examiner rejected these claims “as obvious in
light of the prior art during the prosecution of Honeywell’s patents.”93 In
response to the rejection of these claims, the rejected independent claims were
cancelled, and a number of previously dependent claims were amended into

85. Id. at 1134; see U.S. Patent No. 4,380,893 (filed Feb. 19, 1981) (issued Apr. 26, 1983);
U.S. Patent No. 4,428,194 (filed Sept. 27, 1982) (issued Jan. 31, 1984). The APU generates
electricity and provides compressed air to start the main engines of the aircraft and control the
environment of the cabin during flight, as the need for compressed air changes substantially
during flight. Honeywell, 370 F.3d at 1134. The unit uses a valve to control the quantity of air
exiting the compressor through the air duct that supplies compressed air to the aircraft’s systems.
Id.
86. Honeywell, 370 F.3d at 1134. APUs must be designed to control surge, which is
produced by rapid changes in the aircraft’s demand for compressed air. Id. During a surge, the
air in the main air duct of the APU’s compressor is unable to exit, causing the airflow to reverse
direction and flow back into the compressor and potentially cause damage to the APU. Id.
87. ’893 Patent col.3 ll.64–65. Systems prior to the invention disclosed in the ’893 patent
controlled surge by drawing in excess air and venting the unneeded air through a valve to reduce
the pressure in the main air duct. Honeywell, 370 F.3d at 1134. Although these systems
controlled surge effectively, they were not energy-efficient. Id.
88. Honeywell, 370 F.3d at 1134.
89. Id. The actual flow and the desired flow (as represented by the set point) are compared,
and if the airflow out of the main air duct is too low, the surge bleed valve is opened to prevent a
buildup of pressure and, consequently, surge. Id.
90. Id. at 1136.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 1137. Claims 16 and 32 of the ’893 patent and claims 48 and 49 of the ’194 patent
were the original claims upon which the asserted claims were originally dependent. Id.
93. Honeywell, 370 F.3d at 1137.
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independent form to expressly incorporate the limitations of the rejected
independent claims.94 In other words,
A patent applicant initially seeks a broad independent claim with limitations A,
B and C, but this claim is rejected as obvious in light of the prior art. Instead
of contesting the rejection, the applicant elects to gain allowance by narrowing
his claim scope. He does so by cancelling [sic] the independent claim and
replacing it with a narrower, previously-dependent claim that adds limitation
D. Thus, the applicant surrenders the broader original claim—which only had
limitations A, B and C—and settles instead for the narrower claim with
limitations A, B, C and D.95

Following its recent decisions in Deering Precision Instruments, L.L.C. v.
Vector Distribution Systems, Inc.96 and Ranbaxy Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v.
Apotex, Inc.,97 the Federal Circuit held that the rewriting of dependent claims
into independent form coupled with the cancellation of the original
independent claims creates a presumption of prosecution history estoppel.98
The court reiterated the Supreme Court’s finding in Festo that “the proper
focus is whether the amendment narrows the overall scope of the claimed
subject matter.”99 With this context, the court stated that “[a] presumption of
surrender . . . arises if rewriting the dependent claims into independent form,
along with canceling the original independent claims, constitutes a narrowing
amendment.”100 The court stated that even if the scope of the rewritten claim
is unchanged, history estoppel will be applied if, by canceling the original
claim and rewriting the dependent claims into independent form, the scope of
the subject matter in the independent claim has been narrowed to secure the
patent.101 The majority found that it was “clear that the addition of a new
94. Id. at 1133, 1137–38. The examiner noted that application claims 17 and 35 of the ’893
patent and 51 of the ’194 would be patentable if the claims were rewritten into independent form.
Id. at 1137.
95. Respondent’s Brief in Opposition at 1–2, Honeywell Int’l, Inc. v. Hamilton Sundstrand
Corp., 125 S. Ct. 2928 (2004) (No. 04-293), 2004 WL 2246253.
96. 347 F.3d 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
97. 350 F.3d 1235 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
98. Honeywell, 370 F.3d at 1141, 1143. In addition to Deering and Ranbaxy, the Federal
Circuit previously applied prosecution history estoppel in Diversitech Corp. v. Century Steps,
Inc., 850 F.2d 675 (Fed. Cir. 1988). In Diversitech, the examiner rejected an independent claim
that did not contain the limitation, which was subsequently cancelled and then replaced with a
previously dependent claim that included the limitation. Id. at 681.
99. Honeywell, 370 F.3d at 1141.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 1142. The court cited in a footnote Keith v. Charles E. Hires Co., in which Judge
Learned Hand stated that
[w]e can see no difference between that situation [where the claim was amended to secure
allowance] and one where as here the applicant files a limited and a broader claim at the
same time and then cancels the broader one when it has been rejected. The theory of the
“estoppel,” as it is called is that, by assenting to the cancellation of the claim and by
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claim limitation can give rise to a presumption of prosecution history estoppel,
just like an amendment that narrows a preexisting claim limitation.”102 Thus,
the rule was applicable even in situations where the scope of the rewritten
claim remained unchanged.
Judge Newman dissented in Honeywell.103 She stated that “[t]his new rule
will simply drive patent applicants away from dependent claims and away
from the accepted protocol of presenting successively narrowed dependent
claims for examination.”104 Newman pointed out that the new rule “will
simply raise the cost and increase the difficulty of patent examination.”105 By
adding presumptive estoppels to elements and limitations that were never a
basis of rejection and never narrowed during examination, the court in its
decision “further erodes the ability of inventors to protect their inventions.”106
Newman also posited that “[a]lthough the majority attributes its ruling to the
Supreme Court, this new leap for inventors is not the Court’s work but that of
my colleagues.”107
Newman challenged the majority’s ruling by citing to 35 U.S.C. § 112 for
her contention that when a dependent claim is placed in independent form, the
new independent claim simply states what was previously stated and
incorporated by reference.108 For authority, Newman cited pre-Festo Federal
Circuit cases that support the finding that restating a dependent claim in

amending it, the applicant has abandoned it as it stood. Certainly it cannot be necessary to
this conclusion that he shall amend the cancelled claim, when he has already filed a claim
which contains the necessary differentia.
Id. at 1142–43 n.8 (quoting Keith v. Charles E. Hires Co., 116 F.2d 46, 48 (2d Cir. 1940)).
102. Id. at 1141. The court went on to state that if “only narrowing amendments to
preexisting claim limitations could give rise to the presumption, the purpose of preventing
patentees from recapturing subject matter conceded during prosecution would be undermined.”
Id. The court cited Deering as an example of the Federal Circuit applying the rule post-Festo. Id.
at 1143.
103. Id. at 1146 (Newman, J., dissenting). Judge Newman charged that the court changed the
law in two ways: by going directly against the Patent Act and by adding another restriction to the
doctrine of equivalents, exceeding the Supreme Court’s holdings in Warner-Jenkinson and Festo.
Id.
104. Honeywell, 370 F.3d at 1146.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. The fourth paragraph of § 112 states, “[A] claim in dependent form shall contain a
reference to a claim previously set forth and then specify a further limitation of the subject matter
claimed. A claim in dependent form shall be construed to incorporate by reference all the
limitations of the claim to which it refers.” 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000). Judge Newman went on to
argue, “Rewriting of a claim in accordance with 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 4 can never be a narrowing
amendment, because, by statute, rewriting a dependent claim in independent form does not
narrow the claim’s scope.” Honeywell, 370 F.3d at 1150 (Newman, J., dissenting).
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independent form is not a basis for estoppel.109 In addition, Newman cited the
Federal Circuit’s own holding in the remand of Festo from the Supreme Court,
in which the court stated that “[t]he first question in a prosecution history
estoppel inquiry is whether an amendment filed in the Patent and Trademark
Office has narrowed the literal scope of a claim. If the amendment was not
narrowing, then prosecution history estoppel does not apply.”110
Newman went on to discuss the notice function of prosecution history
estoppel, and the purpose behind the doctrine, stating that canceling an
independent claim in favor of a dependent claim restated as an independent
claim is “not notice of a retrenchment in the scope of the dependent claim.”111
Because restating a dependent claim in dependent form is not retrenchment, it
is not a signal to competitors that the patentee has forfeited equivalents of
remaining claims that have not been rejected.112 In distinguishing the
immediate case from Deering and Ranbaxy, Newman stated that the court had
now imposed an “unbounded estoppel.”113
Finally, Newman’s dissenting opinion discussed the challenge that the
Federal Circuit’s decision would bring to patentees, stating: “Today’s new rule
solves no problem, rights no wrong, addresses no unmet need.”114 Newman
noted that because future applicants may attempt to avoid drafting dependent
claims, applications will cost more, there will be more opportunities for

109. Honeywell, 370 F.3d at 1147. Judge Newman cited Bloom Engineering Co. v. North
American Manufacturing Co., 129 F.3d 1247, 1250 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (holding that restating
original claims in independent form, standing alone, did not change the scope of the original
claims), Wahpeton Canvas Co. v. Frontier, Inc., 870 F.2d 1546, 1553 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (holding
that a dependent claim included all of the limitations of the claim on which it depended), and
Hartness International, Inc. v. Simplimatic Engineering Co., 819 F.2d 1100, 1108 (Fed. Cir.
1987) (holding that a dependent claim included all of the limitations of the independent claim,
with the further limitation of tapered partitions).
110. Honeywell, 370 F.3d at 1148 (quoting Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo
Kabushiki Co., 344 F.3d 1359, 1366–67 (Fed. Cir. 2003)).
111. Id. at 1150.
As support, Newman cited Schwing GmbH v. Putzmeister
Aktiengesellschaft, 305 F.3d 1318, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2002), in which Judge Bryson stated,
“Although prosecution history can be a useful tool for interpreting claim terms, it cannot be used
to limit the scope of a claim unless the applicant took a position before the PTO that would lead a
competitor to believe that the applicant had disavowed coverage of the relevant subject matter.”
Honeywell, 370 F.3d at 1151 (citing Schwing, 305 F.3d at 1324).
112. Honeywell, 370 F.3d at 1151.
113. Id. at 1152. In both Deering, discussed infra Part III.B, and Ranbaxy, the dependent
claim limited an element contained within the original independent claim, thus leading to the
presumption of surrender of “all territory between the original claim limitation and the amended
claim limitation.” Id. (quoting Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S.
722, 740 (2002)).
114. Id. at 1153.
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mistakes, and patent examination within the USPTO will be more time
consuming.115
B.

Deering Precision Instruments, L.L.C. v. Vector Distribution Systems,
Inc.

In Deering Precision Instruments, L.L.C. v. Vector Distribution Systems,
Inc.,116 the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary
judgment of no literal infringement, but vacated the district court’s grant of
summary judgment of no infringement under the doctrine of equivalents.117
The relevant patent assigned to Deering, United States Patent No. 4,744,428
(the “’428 patent”), involved “a compact, light-weight, pocket-type scale
capable of accurately weighing substances up to ten grams.”118 The invention
was important because its design minimized the overall size of the scale while
maintaining the ability to accurately weigh small substances.”119 Deering
initially filed with the USPTO an application containing ten claims, claims 1
and 9 being in independent form.120 Original claim 9 was similar to original
claim 1, but contained an additional limitation, the “Zero Position
Limitation.”121 This limitation refers to the portion of the sliding weight that is
“disposed substantially in an imaginary plane containing the fulcrum of the
beam” when the sliding weight is in the zero position.122 After reviewing the
application, the USPTO rejected claims 1, 2, and 5–7 as being obvious under

115. Id. These and other effects of the court’s rulings in Honeywell and Deering are
discussed infra Part IV. Judge Newman concluded with a personal comment: “The losers are
those patentees who had no reason to foresee today’s new rule, and future patentees who will
have to cope with it.” Id.
116. 347 F.3d 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1184 (2004).
117. Id. at 1316. The district court’s decision can be found at Deering Precision Instruments,
L.L.C. v. Vector Distribution Systems, Inc., No. 01 C 1118, 2001 WL 1035713 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 4,
2001).
118. Deering, 347 F.3d at 1316–17; see U.S. Patent No. 4,744,428 (filed Sept. 29, 1986)
(issued May 17, 1988). The issued patent has five claims, “claims 1, 3, and 4 being in
independent form.” Deering, 347 F.3d at 1317. Claims 1, 2, 4, and 5 were at issue. Id.
119. Deering, 347 F.3d at 1318. The inventors were able to minimize the size of the scale by
designing a sliding weight which moved the weight’s “center of mass closer to the plane created
by the fulcrums of the scale.” Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. Original claim 1 described as follows:
[A] light-weight portable scale having a base, a beam with a substance holder at one end
and a scale extending in an opposite direction, a sliding weight movably carried by the
beam for movement along the scale, a pair of metallic fulcrum posts projecting upwardly
from the base, and a pair of metallic bearing inserts in the beam for cooperation with the
fulcrum posts.
Id. Original claim 3, which was dependent on original independent claim 1, also included the
Zero Position Limitation. Id.
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35 U.S.C. § 103(a).123 The USPTO also “objected to claims 3, 4, and 8–10,
but indicated that they would be allowable if rewritten in independent form.”124
In response, Deering submitted “original claim 3 rewritten in independent form
as new claim 11.”125 The USPTO subsequently issued the patent, with claim
11 listed as independent claim 1.126
Vector also manufactures and sells its own version of a pocket-size scale,
the VX-10.127 The sliding weights of the VX-10 do not extend into the
imaginary plane in which the fulcrum lies when the weights are in their “zero
positions,” and in fact the sliding weights are no closer than .10 inches from
the imaginary plane when in their respective “zero positions.”128 The main
differences between Vector’s VX-10 and Deering’s ’428 patent are the VX10’s additional counterweight and the placement of the sliding weights outside
the plane of the fulcrum.129
Deering sued Vector for infringement upon discovering that Vector was
selling a pocket-size scale.130 The district court determined that Vector’s scale
“did not literally infringe any of the asserted claims of the ’428 patent.”131 In
addition, the district court held that because Deering amended original claim 1
during prosecution by deleting it, the Federal Circuit’s decision in Festo barred
“every asserted claim by Deering concerning equivalents for the Zero Position
Limitation.”132 “The district court held that prosecution history estoppel
applies to any limitation narrowed during prosecution in all claims in the
patent regardless of whether the limitation is present in a claim that itself was
never amended.”133 According to the Federal Circuit, the estoppel question
123. Id. at 1319.
124. Deering, 347 F.3d at 1319.
125. Id. In addition, Deering stated that, with respect to claim 9, which had not been rejected,
the examiner must have overlooked that claim 9 was an independent claim, and that claim 10,
which was rejected, was dependent only from claim 9. Id. Deering stated its belief that “[c]laims
9 and 10 were allowable as written.” Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 1320.
129. Deering, 347 F.3d at 1320. The VX-10 uses an additional stationary counterweight
attached to the substance holder support member, which balances the scale in the zero position.
Id. This is in contrast to the ’428 patent which places the majority of the weight’s center of mass
in the plane of the fulcrum. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 1321. After relying on the intrinsic evidence within the ’428 patent, the district
court determined the Zero Position Limitation “to mean that the weight must enter and penetrate
the imaginary plane containing the fulcrum of the beam.” Id. After this claim construction, the
district court held that the VX-10 did not literally infringe claims 1, 2, 4, and 5 of the ’428 patent,
the claims asserted by Deering to be infringed. Id.
132. Id. at 1321.
133. Id. Even though independent claims 4 and 5 were not amended during prosecution, the
district court barred Deering from asserting the doctrine of equivalents for these claims pursuant
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that related to “Deering’s addition of independent claim 11, coupled with the
clear surrender of the broader subject matter of the deleted original
independent claim[,] presumptively bar[red] Deering from arguing
infringement under the doctrine of equivalents.”134 The Deering court stated
that the “correct focus is on whether amendment surrendered subject matter
that was originally claimed for reasons related to patentability.”135 However,
the focus here is not on whether any particular claim had been subject to a
narrowing amendment, but rather whether the subject matter had been
relinquished.136 In rejecting Deering’s argument that the amendment was
merely “cosmetic,” the court held that the deleted original independent claim
presumptively barred the patentee from arguing equivalents related to the Zero
Position Limitation.137 This presumption was applied by the court to all claims
containing the Zero Position Limitation without regard to whether the claim
was amended during prosecution or not.138 In other words, based on this case,
if a patentee cancels a claim and adds another claim rather than amending a
rejected claim, the added claim will not be entitled to the doctrine of
equivalents even though it had never been amended.
IV. ANALYSIS
A.

Negative Effects of Honeywell and Deering on Patent Drafting

The effects of these cases, especially Honeywell, are profound.139 The
Honeywell and Deering decisions will likely force patent applicants to modify
to the decision in Builder’s Concrete, Inc. v. Bremerton Concrete Products Co., 757 F.2d 255
(Fed. Cir. 1985). In Builders Concrete, the Federal Circuit held that although claim 10 was the
only claim at issue, the prosecution history of all claims was not protected from review to
determine the scope of claim 10. Id. at 260. The court went on to state,
To hold otherwise would be to exalt form over substance and distort the logic of this
jurisprudence. . . . The fact that the “passage” clause of patent claim 10 was not itself
amended during prosecution does not mean that it can be extended by the doctrine of
equivalents to cover the precise subject matter that was relinquished in order to obtain
allowance of claim 1.
Id.
134. Deering, 347 F.3d at 1325.
135. Id. (citing Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 736
(2002)).
136. Thus, independent claim 4, which was never amended during prosecution, contained the
disputed Zero Position Limitation, and prosecution history estoppel presumptively applied
equally to claim 4, as well as dependent claim 5. Id. at 1326.
137. Id. The allowance of claim 1 depended on narrowing the Zero Position Limitation, and
because independent claim 4 and dependent claim 5 both contained the Zero Position Limitation,
prosecution history estoppel applied to each of these claims. Id.
138. Id. (citing Builders Concrete, 757 F.2d at 260).
139. One commentator stated that Honeywell “appears to have so changed the definition of a
dependent claim and to have so changed the effect of its use and its amendment during
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their prosecution procedures and methods in order to prevent the imposition of
estoppel during litigation.140
1.

Applicants Should Avoid Reliance on the Doctrine of Equivalents

In general, applicants need to avoid reliance upon the doctrine of
equivalents in litigation proceedings, as the Federal Circuit’s rulings in the
above cases, as well as other cases involving what were determined to be
narrowing amendments,141 signal the Circuit’s continued expansion of
prosecution history estoppel and the consequent shrinking of the applicability
of the doctrine of equivalents.142 To avoid use of the doctrine of equivalents
and decrease the possibility of estoppel, applicants should draft claims with an
eye toward literal infringement. However, as patentees are forced to rely more
on literal infringement, the purpose upon which the doctrine of equivalents was
based—to protect patentees from non-literally infringing devices with
insubstantial differences from the patented invention—will erode. This

application prosecution that the practitioner should reconsider using dependent claims at all, or
whether or how they should be amended.” FABER, supra note 22, § 2:9, at 2-25.
140. These cases are prime examples that the Federal Circuit focuses its analysis in an
infringement case on the cancelled claim and not the issued claim. Kirk M. Hartung, The
Doctrine of Equivalents: A Matter of Chance and Confusion, 86 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF.
SOC’Y 645, 652 (2004). Hartung presents an example for illustration:
[T]he dependent claim 2 provides for a device comprising A, B, C and D. The accused
device has elements A, B, C and D’. The cancelled independent claim 1 required
elements A, B, and C. The issue is whether D’ is the equivalent of D. Certainly the
accused device A, B, C, D’ is covered by the cancelled claim 1, since each of element A,
B and C are present in the accused device. However, this coverage does not answer
whether D and D’ are equivalent. Cancellation of claim 1 does not mean that claim 2
cannot be infringed if D and D’ are equivalent . . . .
Id.
141. See Diversitech Corp. v. Century Steps, Inc., 850 F.2d 675, 681 (Fed. Cir. 1988)
(providing that the patentee’s arguments surrendered the scope that was claimed as being
equivalent, and thus holding that these arguments applied to every claim, regardless of whether
amendments had actually been made to the individual claim); Builders Concrete, 757 F.2d at 260
(finding that although the claim had not been amended, “the precise subject matter that was
relinquished in order to obtain allowance” of another claim could not be recaptured).
142. A number of commentators have described the burdens that the Federal Circuit’s
decision in Honeywell will have on patent law, and specifically the applicability and usefulness of
the doctrine of equivalents. See Matt Williams, An End to the Doctrine of Equivalents? Festo
Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 42 BRANDEIS L.J. 467, 469–70 (2004). For
recent comments approaching the same issue, see Derek Walter, Prosecution History Estoppel in
the Post-Festo Era: The Increased Importance of Determining What Constitutes a Relevant
Narrowing Claim Amendment, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 123, 125, 145–46 (2005); Wing H.
Liang, Note, Honeywell: The Straw That May Just Break the Inventor’s Back, 26 CARDOZO L.
REV. 2655, 2694–95 (2005); and Andrew J. Tuck, Note, Honeywell International Inc. v.
Hamilton Sundstrand Corp.: A Rose by an Independent Description Does Not Smell as Sweet, 39
GA. L. REV. 1521, 1561–62 (2005).
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becomes especially problematic as patentees are estopped from asserting
infringement because of trivial prosecution errors that have no effect upon the
notice function of their patents.143
2.

The Patenting Process Will Become More Expensive

As a result of these Federal Circuit rulings, the patenting process will
become more expensive.144 In 1965 Congress gave statutory recognition to
dependent claims by providing a fee of “$10 for each claim in independent
form which is in excess of one, and $2 for each claim (whether independent or
dependent) which is in excess of ten.”145 In the same Act, Congress furthered
its preference for dependent claims by amending 35 U.S.C. § 112 to state that
“[a] claim may be written in independent or dependent form, and if in
dependent form, it shall be construed to include all the limitations of the claim
incorporated by reference into the dependent claim.”146
Today, however, the price for each independent claim in excess of three
stands at $200.147 In late 2004 Congress changed the fee structure at the

143. The Federal Circuit in Honeywell continued its recent trend of favoring the notice
function of patents over broader protection against infringement afforded by the doctrine of
equivalents. Sam Niece & Adrienne Yeung, Another Nail in the Doctrine of Equivalents’ Coffin,
NEV. LAW. Sept. 2004, at 23, 24 & n.9 (quoting Pioneer Magnetics, Inc. v. Micro Lenear Corp.,
330 F.3d 1352, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2003)) (“Only the public record of the patent prosecution, the
prosecution history, can be a basis for such a reason. Otherwise, the public notice function of the
patent record would be undermined.”); see Springs Window Fashions LP v. Novo Indus., L.P.,
323 F.3d 989, 995 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“The public notice function of a patent and its prosecution
history requires that a patentee be held to what he declares during the prosecution of his patent.”);
Superior Fireplace Co. v. Majestic Prods. Co., 270 F.3d 1358, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (discussing
the statutory scheme of the Patent Act’s “concern for the public notice and for protecting the
public from the unanticipated broadening of a claim”).
144. The existence of the doctrine of equivalents keeps the price of patenting down, as the
patentee is protected from infringement beyond the literal scope of the drafted claims, and does
not have to draft every conceivable claim to be protected from literal infringement. See Joseph S.
Cianfrani, An Economic Analysis of the Doctrine of Equivalents, 1 VA. J.L. & TECH. 1, 45–49
(1997).
If the ex ante value to the patentee of the territory protected by the doctrine of equivalents
is less than the cost of prosecution, then incentives to innovate would be reduced by an
equal amount if the doctrine were to be eliminated. . . .
....
Were the doctrine of equivalents eliminated . . . . [s]ociety would lose the benefits
provided by the incentives to innovate equal to the costs of the patentee in having to claim
every conceivable variation on the claims, or bear the costs of unenforceability against
unclaimed variations.
Id.
145. Act of July 24, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-83, § 1, 79 Stat. 259, 259.
146. Id. § 9 (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000)).
147. For a list of USPTO fees for the year 2005, see UNITED STATES PATENT AND
TRADEMARK OFFICE, FY 2005 FEE SCHEDULE (2004), www.uspto.gov/go/fees/fee2004
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USPTO in an attempt to increase revenue in order to hire additional patent
examiners to alleviate the backlog of applications.148 As part of this fee
restructuring, which provides for separate filing fees, examination fees, and
search fees, there are extra USPTO fees for patents containing more than
twenty claims.149 The new fee structure will increase prosecution costs at an
inopportune time due to the constriction on dependent claims as provided by
Honeywell and Deering. As practitioners will have to draft tighter claims in
greater quantity, the amount of time to research and draft the claims, and
consequently the fees charged, will increase. With Festo, it was stated that the
case “will most likely result in longer patent applications with more claims,
and more protracted proceedings before the [USPTO], thus increasing the cost
of obtaining patents.”150 The same is likely as a result of these decisions.151
3.

Reliance on Broad Independent Claims and Narrow Dependent
Claims Will Decrease

It may no longer be feasible to rely on broad independent claims followed
by numerous narrow dependent claims. These decisions will force applicants
and patent attorneys to consider the possibility that the broad independent
claim will be rejected, and that, in response, the dependent claims will not be
able to be amended to prevent estoppel in future litigation proceedings. In

dec08.htm [hereinafter 2005 FEE SCHEDULE]. In fact, legislation has been presented that would
increase the fees to be paid to the USPTO. This legislation would raise the costs of filing fees,
the number of claims, the number of independent claims, and other categories. H.R. 1561, 108th
Cong. (2003), available at www.aipla.org/Content/ContentGroups/Legislative_Action/108th_
Congress1/House/hr1561.pdf. For a summary of the current fees and those proposed in the
legislation, see Dennis Crouch, Patent Law Blog, http://patentlaw.typepad.com/patent/2004/11/
in_may_i_report.html (last visited Jan. 21, 2006).
148. Stephen A. Gigot, New Patent Office Fees and Efforts to Harmonize Some Aspects of the
U.S. System with Japanese and European Systems, MARTINDALE.COM, Jan. 15, 2005,
http://lawyers.martindale.com/xp/Martindale/Legal_Articles/article_search.xml (type “Gigot”
into last name field and “Stephen” into first name field) (free registration required to view).
149. 2005 FEE SCHEDULE, supra note 147; see also Molly M. Peterson, IT Groups Back
Temporary Patent Office User Fee Boost, GOVEXEC.COM, Sept. 14, 2004,
http://www.govexec.com/dailyfed/0904/091404cdam1.htm (explaining that the patent office has
long suffered by having its fees diverted to other government agencies and has thus been unable
to retain examiners who often escape to the private sector for higher salaries).
150. Steven J. Rizzi & Jessica L. Bagner, Litigating Infringement Under the Doctrine of
Equivalents After Festo, 721 PAT. LITIG. 345, 369 (2002).
151. In 2003, the average legal cost to file a utility patent application was about $10,000
according to the American Intellectual Property Law Association Economic Survey. See Melissa
Mahler, Protecting Your IP Assets, NIXON PEADBODY, July, 14, 2004,
http://www.nixonpeabody.com/publications_detail3.asp?Type=P&PAID=57&ID=682. The costs
for prosecuting a patent to completion, including fees paid to the USPTO, and attorney’s fees,
generally range from $10,000 to $30,000 per patent. Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the
Patent Office, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1495, 1498 (2001).
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considering the possibility of this situation, the patent attorney should draft
independent claims that will reduce the chances that a narrowing amendment
will be necessary for patentability. To accomplish this goal, the practitioner
must draft tighter independent claims, ones that are broad enough to not be
found unpatentable in view of the prior art, but that provide adequate coverage
of the invention.152
4.

The Use of Dependent Claims Will Decrease, While Multiple
Independent Claims Will Be Utilized

Dependent claims, which are used for clarity and efficiency,153 will likely
be utilized less as a result of these recent decisions.154 Dependent claims are
not narrowed by cancellation of an independent claim. Although “[e]xcessive
use of independent claims is a hallmark of a poorly written patent
application,”155 an increase in the number of independent claims within an
application may help the applicant avoid the problems associated with
amendment. Applicants should draft multiple independent claims of varying
specificity and narrowness so as to decrease the chances of estoppel while
providing the invention with adequate coverage for literal infringement and use
of the doctrine of equivalents. Although independent claims normally use
broad definitions that are supported and clarified by narrower dependent
claims, applicants must now draft independent claims of varying terminology
to provide more specificity.156 At the very least, the applicant should file a few
claims that are sure to be patented without the need for an amendment.

152. Patentees drafted narrow claims following the Federal Circuit’s decision in Festo to
avoid having to make amendments due to the potential of a complete bar, but are now drafting
broader claims following the Supreme Court’s opinion in Festo, which did away with the
complete bar. Rizzi & Bagner, supra note 150, at 368. Despite the absence of a complete bar,
patentees should still be careful in drafting claims, as there is still uncertainty regarding
application of the rebuttable presumption in the Supreme Court’s opinion. Id.
153. See, e.g., Honeywell Int’l Inc. v. Hamilton Sundstrand Corp., 370 F.3d 1131, 1148 (Fed.
Cir. 2004).
By the early twentieth century the Office recognized that for clarity, brevity, and
convenience the use of dependent claims “would reduce the number of claims and make
division between independent inventions clear and easy” because “such a claim would be
self-analyzing and self-classifying, and therefore make the examination of the claim
easier.”
Id. (quoting Ex parte Brown, 1917 C.D. 22 (Comm’r Pat. 1917)).
154. It should be noted that some practitioners are hesitant to write dependent claims. 1
IRVING KAYTON, PATENT PRACTICE 3-6 (4th ed. 1989).
155. Robert D. Fish, Cost-Effective Patenting, FINDLAW.COM, 2003, http://library.
findlaw.com/2003/Oct/24/133108.html.
156. See FABER, supra note 22, § 2:9, at 2-23 (“Dependent claims are used to add additional
features and/or to expand upon and to detail previously claimed features.”).
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Another possibility is for the applicant to initially file narrow patent claims and
file broader claims in a continuation application.157
By decreasing the use of dependent claims, and increasing the number of
independent claims, the result will be an increase in the number of elements
within these claims. However, because every element of a claim must be
found in the alleged infringing device to prove infringement,158 patentees will
consequently be less protected in infringement litigation.159
5.

The Patenting Process Will Require More Time

Another implication of the rulings of Deering and Honeywell is an increase
in the time required to properly examine and prosecute a patent. Remember
that stating “[a] claim in dependent form shall be construed to incorporate by
reference all the limitations of the claim to which it refers,”160 and that
“dependent . . . claims shall be presumed valid even though dependent upon an
invalid claim.”161 Thus, the use of independent and dependent claims assists in
the speedy examination of patent applications, as the examiner only has to read
the independent claim, and then each dependent claim specifically referencing
that independent claim.162 Practitioners will now be forced to draft more
patent claims in independent form to avoid the application of prosecution
history estoppel, and as a result, the difficulty inherent in interpreting the

157. Once an application has been filed with the USPTO, an applicant may file subsequent or
continuation applications. CHISUM & JACOBS, supra note 18, at 2-107–08. A continuation-inpart application “is an application filed during the lifetime of an earlier nonprovisional
application, repeating some substantial portion or all of the earlier nonprovisional application and
adding matter not disclosed in the said earlier nonprovisional application.” MPEP, supra note
33, § 201.08. Some commentators have argued in favor of abolishing the practice of
continuations. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley & Kimberly A. Moore, Ending Abuse of Patent
Continuations, 84 B.U. L. REV. 63, 65 (2004).
158. See Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 607 (1950) (“In
determining whether an accused device or composition infringes a valid patent, resort must be
had in the first instance to the words of the claim. If accused matter falls clearly within the claim,
infringement is made out and that is the end of it.”).
159. See Jamesbury Corp. v. Litton Indus. Prods., Inc., 586 F.2d 917, 924 (2d Cir. 1978)
(“[I]n a patent claim, more means less . . . .”). As an example, if a claim contains the limitations
A, B, and C, an invention is infringing if these limitations are present. However, as claims must
be drafted tighter to avoid having to amend during prosecution, the claim will likely contain
additional limitations, such as D, which must also be present in the potentially infringing
invention for that invention to infringe upon the claim.
160. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000).
161. Id. § 282. The statute has “resulted in nearly universal usage of dependent claims,
simplifying the jobs of everyone who must ever consider the patents.” FABER, supra note 22, §
2:9, at 2-25.
162. See FABER, supra note 22, § 2:9, at 2-24 (“The main advantage of dependent claims, of
course, is that they require far less time to examine, and those using them should be given a
financial incentive.”).
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invention being sought in a specific claim, as well as the differences between
what is included in each individual independent claim, will increase. Courts
should not place additional pressure on the USPTO and patentees, especially as
the time required for patenting continues to increase.163
6.

Claim Drafting Will Require a Higher Degree of Foreseeability

Honeywell and Deering amplified the need for applicants and practitioners
to approach initial claim drafting with a mind toward rejection by the
examiner. These cases require the attorney to be even more proactive than
normal, recognizing that in order to salvage an application and achieve
patentability, a previously dependent claim may need to be incorporated into
the original independent claim that it references. These cases require a higher
degree of foreseeability in terms of drafting a claim as either independent or
dependent, as the choice of either one could influence the scope of any
possible equivalents and inadvertently lead to the application of prosecution
history estoppel due to the amendment of the previously dependent claim.164
After the Federal Circuit’s Festo decision, “patent prosecutors resorted to
drafting narrow claims so as to avoid amending them during prosecution and
risking a complete bar.”165 Honeywell and Deering will force prosecutors to
second-guess placing a claim in dependent form, as opposed to independent
form, in order to reduce the risk of estoppel. At a minimum, the Honeywell
decision requires the claim-drafter to acknowledge that there may not be a
range of equivalents available for the subject matter contained in the filed
dependent claims if those dependent claims are subsequently converted to
independent claims.
7.

The Doctrine of Equivalents Has Again Been Limited

Honeywell and Deering further constricted the applicability of the doctrine
of equivalents upon the field of patent law. The Supreme Court in Festo
established a presumption of surrender, with a consideration for the differences

163. This is an especially difficult problem in terms of the stress that is placed on the USPTO
and its examiners to decrease the time required to patent an invention. In fact, Jon W. Dudas, the
former head of the USPTO, states that the average time needed to review a patent, presently more
than two years, is expected to double in five years. John W. Schoen, U.S. Patent Office Swamped
by Backlog, MSNBC.COM, Apr. 27, 2004, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/4788834. According to
Dudas, this “could have a chilling effect on innovation.” Id.
164. “Foreseeability” is also being applied to the use of prosecution history estoppel in terms
of rebutting the presumption that estoppel applies. See Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo
Kabushiki Co., 344 F.3d 1359, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2003). Thus, attorneys have been burdened lately
by having to exercise greater foresight in terms of anticipating equivalents and possible
rejections.
165. Rizzi & Bagner, supra note 150, at 368.
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in scope between the original and amended claims.166 These cases, however,
signal a warning to practitioners that prosecution history estoppel has stretched
beyond the boundaries set by the Supreme Court. The cancellation of broad
claims may restrict narrow claims to their literal terms, despite the fact that
these claims were allowable following the initial application by the patentee
and were never amended.167 As the courts continue to limit the ability of
patentees to stretch beyond the literal scope of their claims, the doctrine of
equivalents and the protections it provides patentees will be further limited.
8.

Patentees Will Be More Likely To Appeal a Rejection and Argue That
the Reason for Amendment Is Not for Patentability

As previously stated, applicants are given two choices when the examiner
rejects the patent: appeal the rejection and argue with the examiner regarding
the reasons for rejection, or amend the claim in view of the prior art and the
reasons for rejection.168 In view of the Federal Circuit’s recent rulings and the
devastating effects of estoppel in litigation proceedings, applicants will be
more inclined to appeal the rejection as opposed to amending claims. This is
especially true for applicants who are forced into this situation when the
amendments are for minor matters, such as changing a dependent claim into an
independent claim without adding any new limitations. In addition, the
applicant should argue before amending that any such amendment is for some
reason other than patentability, as prosecution history estoppel deals with
amendments made for patentability purposes.169
B.

Positive Effects of Honeywell and Deering on Patent Drafting

Although there are many negative consequences regarding the Federal
Circuit’s decisions in Honeywell and Deering, there are also positive rationales
and outcomes to be considered.
1.

The Notice Function of Patents Should Be Preserved and Protected

The courts have always looked at the doctrine of equivalents with
trepidation, as reflected in the many decisions limiting its use and expanding
upon the areas covered by prosecution history estoppel.170 The courts have
166. Festo, 344 F.3d at 1368 (citing Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co.,
535 U.S. 722, 741 (2002)).
167. See discussion supra Part II.E.
168. See supra notes 18–19 and accompanying text; Festo, 535 U.S. at 736.
169. Applicants are permitted to conduct interviews with examiners to discuss the reasons for
rejections. United States Patent and Trademark Office, Examination of Applications and
Proceedings in the Patent and Trademark Office, http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/doc/
general/exam.htm (last visited Jan. 21, 2006).
170. See Jerome G. Lee et al., Equitable Defenses in Patent Cases, 320 PAT. LIT. 571, 643–44
(1991) (“Federal Circuit decisions demonstrate the expansion of prosecution history estoppel to
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limited the use of the doctrine by considering the public’s interests in
notification regarding the boundaries of the patentee’s claimed invention.171
The doctrine of equivalents protects the indeterminate bounds of a patent,
which may inhibit the development of new products.172 Thus, the broad
interpretations and reach of these patent claims may be seen as inhibiting the
promotion of the arts and sciences that the patent laws were designed to uphold
under the Constitution. The rulings in Honeywell and Deering represent
another step towards abolishing the doctrine of equivalents and protecting the
notice function of patents.
2.

The Applicant Knows That the Claim Scope Is Being Narrowed and
the Attorney’s Decision to Amend Should Be Honored

Recall that a dependent claim must contain reference to another claim “and
then specify a further limitation of the subject matter claimed.”173 Thus, the
applicant is aware that claim scope is being narrowed and surrendered by
incorporating the independent claim into the dependent claim because the

include consideration of limitations imposed by an increasingly expansive set of factors related to
the prosecution process, besides the file wrapper itself, when applying the doctrine of
equivalents.”).
171. Recently, a Federal Circuit judge noted the public’s right to know the inventions that
would infringe, and those that would not. SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp., 365 F.3d
1306, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2004), vacated en banc, 403 F.3d 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (Gajarsa, J.,
concurring). In a concurring opinion in SmithKline, Judge Gajarsa stated that early cases such as
Bates v. Coe, a Supreme Court decision from 1878, “demonstrate the longstanding centrality of
the public notice function to patent policy.” Id. at 1328–29; see Bates v. Coe, 98 U.S. 31, 39
(1878).
Accurate description of the invention is required by law, for several important purposes:
1. That the government may know what is granted, and what will become public property
when the term of the monopoly expires. 2. That licensed persons desiring to practice the
invention may know during the term how to make, construct, and use the invention. 3.
That other inventors may know what part of the field of invention is unoccupied.
Bates, 98 U.S. at 39.
172. Thomas K. Landry, Certainty and Discretion in Patent Law: The On Sale Bar, The
Doctrine of Equivalents, and Judicial Power in the Federal Circuit, 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 1151,
1172–73 (1994).
For potential infringers, extra caution means licensing or avoiding patented technology,
even where legal rights are honestly disputable. . . . The inventor might be chilled from
offering the invention for sale, thus forgoing income that might be needed and hampering
public choice by depriving the public of knowledge about the state of the art. . . .
. . . Lawsuits become more complex, and enforcement and defense more expensive,
as indeterminacy and unpredictability increase.
Id. In an early Federal Circuit decision in the Festo dispute, Judge Plager, in a concurring
opinion, stated that the Federal Circuit attempted to limit some of the indeterminacy of the
doctrine of equivalents by establishing a set of bright-line rules. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku
Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 234 F.3d 558, 592 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
173. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000).
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claim now involves further limitation. In addition, the decision to amend fits
within the expertise of the patent attorney. The lawyer’s conscious decision
regarding the bounds of the claimed invention should be honored by the court.
Additionally, it is important to view claim amendments from another
angle. If the applicant had rewritten the independent claim to incorporate the
dependent claim and its limitation, and subsequently cancelled the dependent
claim, the resultant claim would be the same as rewriting a dependent claim in
independent form and canceling the originally independent claim. The first
situation would result in prosecution history estoppel, and as the resultant
claims would be identical, the logical conclusion is that the latter should also
be held to be a narrowing amendment and subject to prosecution history
estoppel.
3.

Patentees May Still Rebut the Presumption of Estoppel

Despite the fact that prosecution history estoppel may be presumed on a
wider basis following Honeywell and Deering, the patentee is still not
completely estopped from asserting the doctrine of equivalents against
potentially infringing devices. A patentee is still afforded the right to rebut this
presumption of estoppel per the standards dictated in Festo.174 These cases
may tighten the scope of the doctrine of equivalents and provide patentees with
less recourse in the face of potential infringers, but the safeguards provided by
the Supreme Court in Festo still afford patentees the opportunity to avoid
estoppel.
4.

Patentees Will Not Have To Rebut the Presumption of Estoppel As
Often

With regard to the presumption of estoppel under Festo, the court’s
holding in Honeywell may in a way aid the patentee and the practitioner. By
increasing the frequency of independent claims, and decreasing the usage of
dependent claims, there is a higher possibility of obtaining a judgment of
infringement under the doctrine of equivalents without having the burden of
overcoming Festo’s presumption.175 The patentee will not be found to have
forfeited its rights under the doctrine of equivalents due to the decreased need
for amendments.

174. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 740–41 (2002).
There is a belief that it is substantially easier to overcome the presumption in a number of hightech areas because of the rapid evolution in technology, including computer software,
biotechnology, and telecommunications. Rizzi & Bagner, supra note 150, at 364.
175. See Niece & Yeung, supra note 143, at 24.
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V. CONCLUSION
Although courts generally desire to uphold the notice function of patent
claims by strengthening prosecution history estoppel and inhibiting the use of
the doctrine of equivalents in patent litigation, the Federal Circuit in Honeywell
and Deering failed to properly consider and evaluate the negative ramifications
of these decisions on the patenting process and the protection of patents and
inventions. The extension of prosecution history estoppel to situations in
which a patentee makes a dependent claim into an independent claim,
especially when the patentee has not added further limitations than that which
were in the original application, does not bolster the notice function of patents,
which prosecution history estoppel was designed to protect. The patentee does
not surrender ground in amending the application in such a manner, as the
scope of the invention is not disturbed. These decisions will force applicants
to avoid reliance on the doctrine of equivalents, raise the cost of patenting,
increase reliance on multiple independent claims while decreasing the use of
dependent claims, make the patenting process more time consuming, and lead
applicants to increasingly appeal rejections. In sum, the decisions in Deering
and Honeywell are just another step toward dissolving the doctrine of
equivalents and the protections it provides.
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